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Abstract 
 
Modern constitutional and political concepts, in a broad sense, represent an expressed codification 
of the elements of value that structure the relevant society or the particular group that tries to 
project or channel them through the existing order. The secularism vs. Islamism dichotomy is a part 
of such a conceptual framework. The author elaborates and compares both ultimate constitutional and 
political designs, specifying them through the example of Turkey and Iran, as well as to shows the basic 
characteristics through the prism of their political legitimacy, the organization of power, the human rights 
and freedoms, as well as the possibility of political activism. The thesis that the author notes develops in the 
direction of a warning that the extremes contained in the constitutional provisions in the vividly ideologically 
divided societies can be a source of a conflict and/or can generate instability or suffocation of the pluralism 
in the political arena.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The phenomenon of the secularism-Islamism dichotomy in the modern 
constitutional design of the contemporary Muslim societies became characteristic 
especially after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and conceived after the victory of the 
Kemalists in Turkey in 1924. This paper is but a general conceptual illustration aimed at 
determining several key respects. Firstly, what constitutes the core of the secular and the 
Islamist constitutional postulate and what are its visible features? Secondly, what are the 
essential differences in the access to political and societal value components, manifested 
through the prism of the organization of power, human rights and freedoms and the 
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possibility of a political action? Lastly, yet not less ephemeral, the paper illustrates the 
historical genesis of the occurrence of the respective constitutional and political groups, 
and, thus would assume the trajectory of their impact on the social life. 
The political system gains its primary social category codification through the 
primacy of the constitutional design. Thereto, its essential determinant is its stabilization 
and valorization of the political value elements of the mainsail of the social fabric or a 
particular group. The latter domain depends largely on his consistent output. Heywood is 
absolutely right when he notes that although the idea of constitutionalism is closely 
associated with liberal tendencies, there is nothing that would prevent the undemocratic 
character of the constitution (Hejvud 2004, 542). Thus, if the constitutional conception is 
undemocratic, it ejects certain subjects in the affirmative or subordinate role, and we cannot 
talk about a democratic political system. 
This statement aims to reconfirm our next question: Are there, actually, in the 
constitutional political design of Turkey and Iran, provisions that affirm some at the 
expense of other political parties, and what generation gets through the political discourse? 
Can the other thesis, the one of Fareed Zakaria strengthen the “illiberal democracy” 
(Zakaria 1997, 27) to be plausible in our case? Can we identify a system that would be 
basically democratic and not open–plural, and to what extent can such a system be 
modeled? To which extent the existing constitutional and political systems of Turkey and 
Iran are willing to be open to individuals with different political and ideological platforms 
of the established official doctrine? 
The attempt of copying a constitutional political order inherent in the Western 
European regimes in Turkey under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1924 and its acute rejection 
and the designing of their own “Islamic” model in Iran led by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1974 
paved the way in the Muslim world for the future model of a socio-political organization 
and orientation. In fact, the two countries represent, to a greater or a lesser extent, an 
identification basis, or an initial burst and a benchmark for the countries of the Muslim 
provenance – though quite often degenerated and transformed into an authoritarian regime, 
especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the communist regimes and 
the Soviet Union. Both countries contain fairly homogeneous religious or, even, ethnic 
structure, and produce radically different socio-political and constitutional creeds as the 
basic creed of political action, domestically and internationally. This narrative would, 
undoubtedly, lead to a polarization of the political climate and the social existence in 
general. Hereafter, the author would address exactly those components. It is especially 
important to note that the concepts in the paper are related to the basics of the constitutional 
and the political design and it does not include the recent developments in Turkey, such as 
the attempted coup and the initiative last constitutional changes that strengthen the power 
of President Erdogan. 
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KEMALIST TURKEY: 
MILITANT SECULARISM AND TURKISH NATIONALISM 
 
Happy is the one who says, I am a Turk 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 
 
The transformation of Turkey as a pro-Western state with institutions such as the 
Western European ones began after the defeat in the First World War. A lot of factors 
contributed to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the change into a secular republic. 
Firstly, the continuum consists of: the growth of the Young Turks movement, a series of 
numerous national liberation uprisings of the various ethnicities in the Empire and, finally, 
the defeat in the Balkan Wars, the Great War and the peace Treaties of Sevres and 
Lausanne. On October 29, 1923 it was proclaimed the Republic and the very same day 
Mustafa Kemal was elected as its first president. Schulz notes that it, in fact, was the first 
victory of the urban nationalists over the old regime in the modern Islamic world, and the 
republic came to symbolize the victory. Its ideals, such as sovereignty and share of power, 
fully corresponded to urban the Turkish nationalist worldview, aimed at the “European 
discourse” (Schulze 2000, 53). Ataturk strengthened its position by implementing a single-
party system, and under the guise of pacifism expressed in the motto “Peace at home – 
peace in the world”, he removed all the competitive forces that would threaten his power 
and authority. The multiparty system established itself almost a decade after his death. 
Before the brief examination of the organization of the government, the central 
institutions and the fundamental values of the constitutional and the political order of 
Kemalist Turkey, several essential activities that contributed to de-islamization of the 
Turkish society should be pointed out: the abolition of the Sultanate, the abolition of the 
Madrasas, the abolition of the Caliphate, the acceptance of the Latin alphabet instead of the 
Arabic script, the prohibition of the fez and the turban as a social reactionary decadence, 
the declaration of Sunday as a holiday instead of Friday (Juma), the agrarian reform and the 
abolition of polygamy, as well as the legal equality accompanied by the suffrage of women 
etc. The series of such steps determines the roadmap towards Westernization and the exit 
from the traditional Orientalism. 
Turkey is a Parliamentary republic whose political system is largely based on the 
position of the Parliament and the cooperation with the bi-cephalous executive. The 
constitutional order has experienced three general metamorphoses; from the concentration 
of power in the hands of the Parliament and the unreal separation of the powers between the 
legislative and the executive (the 1924 Constitution), through a bi-cameral legislative – 
introducing a Senate as a second (upper) House and strengthening the Government's 
position – the Ministerial Council (Bakanlar Kurulu) and the prime Minister (Bashbakan), 
the creation of the Constitutional Court, the separation of the party membership and the 
militarist provenance of the President (the 1961 Constitution), to the final stipulation of the 
fundamental human rights and freedoms as an integral part of the Turkish society, as well 
as strengthening the powers of the President, mirroring the French Fifth Republic and the 
abolition of the Senate (the 1982 Constitution), (Demiri 2009, 114). 
The central institutions under the current Constitution have the following 
characteristics: first, legislative power is unicameral. The Turkish Great National Assembly 
(Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi) counts 550 MPs with a five-year mandate that almost 
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always expires prematurely, due to the political preferences of the parties. The scope of 
authority is almost identical in all hybrid (parliamentary-presidential) modes: making and 
changing laws, political control of the Council of Ministers, budget approving, ratification 
of international agreements, decisions of war and peace, etc. Second, the executive is bi-
cephalous with increased powers of the President (Cumhurbashkan) expressed through 
several parameters: to convoke a special session of the Assembly, the right to veto laws, to 
call a referendum on constitutional amendments, the appointment of the first Minister and 
pressing charges against legal and natural persons of disrespect for the Constitution and the 
laws, to appoint members of the High Education Council, rectors of universities, judges in 
the constitutional, military and cassation court etc, (Ahmad 2006, 1371).  
On the other hand, the Council of Ministers (Bakanlar Kurulu) and the Prime 
Minister (Bashbakan) are accountable to the Assembly for the implementation of the 
current domestic and foreign policy, whereupon the ministerial solidarity, apart from the 
individual responsibility is characteristic. Third, the courts, according to the provisions of 
the Constitution are independent and make decisions on the basis of the Constitution and 
the laws, and the Constitution in its regulations notes the State Council, the Supreme 
Administrative Court, the Supreme Military Administrative Court, the Supreme Military 
Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court as organs of the justice system in the 
Republic. After the central state organs were briefly elaborated, let us view the fundamental 
values and principles of the political system of Kemalist Turkey. 
 
Turkish nationalism and populism (Halkchilik) 
 
The transformation of the Ottoman Empire in a secular Turkish Republic took the 
Turkish nationalism and the doctrines of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk as a starting point. This 
executed a radical shift in the identification database of the citizens and the legitimization 
of power. Instead of the former Islamic landmarks, nowadays, Turkish nationalism takes 
the role of a connective tissue of the Turkish society. Even the existing Constitution calls 
for Turkey to be devoted to the nationalism of Atatürk (Constitution of the Republic of 
Turkey, 1982, Preamble). Tamimi and Esposito suggest many political commitments that 
have modeled this concept. For example, the recomposing Turkish history, the elimination 
of much of the Ottoman past, the affirmation of the pre-Islamic perioid, the formation of 
the Turkish Historical Association and the Turkish Language Institution, even the 
mythological paradigm that Asia Minor is the homeland of Turkey, the cradle of humanity 
and civilization and the Turkish language the basis of all languages (Tamimi and Esposito 
2000, 3). Еxtreme nationalist tendencies were stirred up through a lot of attempts the 
Islamic religious practices (prayer and ezan), instead of in Arabic, to be conducted in 
Turkish. In addition, “Altit ok”, or the doctrine of “the six arrows” that follows the 
Turanism (Panturcism) as a foreign policy orientation. The general motto of populism 
(Halkchik) was expressed in the slogan “the people against the elites”, which certainly 
served to strengthen the nationalist rhetoric. 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 3, No. 1, 2017 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com 
            
 
53 
 
National sovereignty 
 
The establishment of the Turkish Republic on the remains of the former Ottoman 
Empire meant a change in the legitim aspect of the Government. The former Sultan used to 
bear several titles that gave him political and religious position in society: Caliph (leader of 
Muslims), Emir al-Mumin (leader of the faithful) and Shaykh Lab Islam (regulator of 
religious issues) (Kulenovic 2008, 43). There is an evident religious inclination. Kemalism 
drastically changes this framework. Ataturk was named the immortal and the eternal leader, 
unrivaled in national history. The republican polity and sovereignty are exclusively and 
unconditionally based on the Turkish nation. The Turkish nation expresses its sovereignty 
through the authorized institutions that operate on constitutional principles. The sovereignty 
of the Turkish nation can not be transferred to any individual, group or class that is not in 
accordance with the Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, article 6). 
 
Militant secularism 
 
One of the determinant specifics of the Turkish constitutional order and political 
system is the militant secularism. The steps taken for the de-islamization of the Turkish 
society were already stated. In addition, a significant moment was the de-shariazation of the 
Turkish legal system, as well as some points that insulated the ulema and plunged it into a 
marginalized position of the political life. Thus, the previous Sharia law was replaced by 
the dull takeover of the Swiss Civil Code, the Italian Criminal Code and the German Trade 
Law. In this regard, the former Sharia judges were retired and the religious schools either 
banned or periodically opened, however under a strict state control. Religious clothes 
outside the mosques were banned, religious titles suppressed, religious teaching in public 
schools was prohibited, all Sufi orders were declared ilegal and Zakat (religious obligation) 
was strictly monitored by the state and military etablishment. Moreover, the fierce form of 
the social and militant secularism got another dimension, a military one, through the role of 
the military. The military was a self-declared “guardian of the secular Republic,” the 
defender of the secular ideology and stability of the country (Tamimi and Esposito 2000, 
3). Led by the self-set political iconography, the military itself, few times, directly or 
indirectly, participated in the overthrow of pro–Islamic governments (or Prime Ministers), 
the subject of the third part of the paper. Secularism was not founded only on the separation 
of religion and state, but it was contributed with hatred, bigotry, intolerance, rigidity and 
militancy against everything that showed even the smallest amount of religious affinities. 
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KHOMEINI’S IRAN: 
BETWEEN SHARIOCRACY AND MODIFIED THEOCRACY 
  
Islam is our full guidance 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini 
 
Unlike Turkey, which is elaborated in the previous section, the situation in Iran is 
reversed. Iran has transformed its own political identity distinctively from West oriented to 
revival Islamist. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 was preceded by numerous turbulent 
political events that acted as a decisive factor for the revolutionary developments. Thus, in 
1941, the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi inherited the power from his father, Reza Khan 
Pahlavi. After the Second World War, he started implementing numerous pro-Western 
modernist reformations i.e. the “White revolution”, similar to Kemalist Turkey. The 
emphasis was placed on language and nationalism, religious symbols, such as the Hijab, 
was withdrawn from the public life, with incorporation of the civil society and the Western 
civil legal codex (except the family law that received a modified expression through state-
controlled Sharia courts). The victory of Mosaddegh on the parliamentary elections in 1951 
(followed by his nationalization of the oil industry), that the Shah could not prevent; his 
abdication in 1953, his re-intronization and return to power with the help of his British and 
American allies after six days – all these events started electrifying the society in Iran 
(Akhavi 1980, 42). Deprivation grew linearly with the growing authoritarianism of 1961, 
when the Shah suspend the Parliament and eliminated the political opponents with the help 
of the secret police called SAVAK. The leader of the Islamic Opposition, the ayatollah 
Khomeini, was in exile, primarily because of his explicit political confrontation with the 
Shah and his acute rhetoric against the US imperialism. The 1979 revolution absorbed all 
social strata dissatisfied with the Shah’s regime (Islamists, secularists, Marxists, liberals, 
etc.), yet, still, only the Islamic provenance managed to institutionalize order, based on the 
Khomeini’s doctrine. From the political scene, from the administrative bodies, from the 
educational institutions and virtually all other social segments were eliminated anti-Islam 
parties, primarily secularists and liberals. Political and socio-cultural reflections were 
evident through the obligatory wearing of the Islamic dress, censorship of certain content in 
the mass media, compulsory teaching of the religious doctrines, the Islamic ideological 
army, education and culture. Iranian nationalism has been replaced by the construction of a 
Muslim nation of Iran, as an inseparable part of the overall Muslim community (Ummah). 
This kind of a set of policy interventions became a constitutional category (Constitution of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, Preamble). The constitutional and political system of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran is a sui generis design, typical of the Persian territory, and its 
revolutionary and Islamic narrative – an inspiration for a series of attempts for installing an 
Islamic state. It is a combination of strong leadership, religious and legalistic establishment, 
nominal executive and consultative legislation. In addition, the most important of its 
features, through an institutional lens, are to be reviewed. 
First, the central institution in the Islamic Iranian model is the Supreme Leader 
(Vali Faqih) – Ayatollah (Khomeini, then Al Khamenei), who has not only ceremonial, but, 
also, a real political power. He is, also, a chairperson of the leadership council (valiet), 
composed of the most eminent experts in the Islamic law and the Shiite doctrine of the 
twelfth Imam. It names the head of the judiciary, six members of the Council of the Guards, 
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commanders of all the armed forces, leaders of the Friday Juma prayers, and the head of the 
national radio and television, and decides on war and peace, as well. The election of the 
President of the Islamic Republic must be confirmed by the Ayatollah (Demiri 2009, 264). 
As a result of the constellation, the Supreme Leader controls nearly all aspects of the 
political life. Despite the political, the Supreme Leader, also, asserts spiritual leadership of 
the Iranian Muslim nation, because he comes from the eminent Islamic jurists (mujtahid), 
exegesis experts, members of the leadership council mentioned above. Secondly, the 
supervisory authority is concentrated in the Assembly of Experts (Madzhma el Neza), 
whose task is to appoint, monitor and control the operation of the Supreme Leader, to assist 
him in the creation of his politics and to initiate the process of the impeachment if the 
Ayatollah does not perform his tasks in accordance with the Constitution. This body is 
elected to fixed terms of 8 years, proposed by the Council of Guardians (Constitution of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, articles 108-111). Third, one of the most powerful political 
bodies in charge of controlling the legislative party nominations for the elections and all the 
specific policy actions is the Council of the Guardians of the Islamic Republic (Shura-e 
Negbahan). It is composed of 12 members (six Islamic and six civil law experts – the first 
appointed by the Supreme Leader, and the latter by the Parliament and proposed by the 
Supreme Judicial Council), with a six-year term. The Council of the Guardians of the 
Islamic Republic has the right to veto on virtually any domestic political, economic and 
foreign trade initiative. Fourth, the executive, nominal and limited by the leadership and the 
Council of Guardians, is composed of the President and the Council of Ministers. The 
President is elected in general and direct elections, with obligatory confirmation by the 
Parliament to fixed terms of four years, with the right to one re-election. His role as head of 
the executive is to implement policies in line with the Constitution and the laws, setting and 
recalling of ambassadors, and a chairperson of the National Security Council. His power, as 
well as the power of his cabinet (the Council of Ministers) is limited by the institutions that 
listed above. Finally, the consultative legislation – the Parliament (Majlis Shura-i Islami) 
consists of 270 members elected for four years. The Constitution empowers this body to 
enact laws (actually, consults, because the final decision is to the Council of Guardians); it, 
also, empowers it to ratify international treaties, to elect Ministers in the President’s cabinet 
and to initiate investigations on any political issue in the country (Alaedini at al, 2006, 
621). As far as the judiciary is concerned, I would mention only the High Judicial Council 
composed of the head of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General and three members 
placed directly by the Supreme Leader, who at any time, may revoke. The Constitution 
guarantees their independence, impartiality and fairness. 
After the institutional design was briefly presented, now, the stress is to be put on 
the ideological values and the fundamental benchmarks of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
 
God's sovereignty (Hakamia) and Modeled shariocracy 
 
What greatly reflects the Iranian Republic, at least on the ideological level, is the 
doctrinal divine sovereignty (hakamia). The Constitution notes that the sovereignty belongs 
to Allah s.a.w.t., which is legitimate, and it is a submission to His will (Constitutional 
principle II). Unlike popular sovereignty, according to which the expressed will of the 
citizens is essential for socio-economic and political action, the Iranian system is based on 
an a priori given philosophy and principles through a divine revelation (Quran), and all 
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authorities, including citizens, have a duty to implement. Authorities have merely “limited” 
forms of administrating, because Allah S.W.T. is sovereign of any forms of life and they 
are governors who need to fulfill His will. The Constitution is determined as a declaration 
of social, cultural, political and economic foundations of the Iranian society based on 
Islamic principles and norms, which reflect the genuine desire of the Islamic community 
(the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, Preamble). This formulation clearly 
alludes to the Sharia as a legal order. However, the introduction of the republican model, 
alongside with the participation of citizens in the selection of holders of certain public 
functions (Constitutional principle I) for which there are no distinctively precise provisions 
in the Koran, as well as the modifying of some provisions of domestic, commercial and 
even criminal law, provides the opportunity, this model regime to be assessed as modeled 
shariocracy. 
Rule of eminent Islamic jurists (Velajet e Faqih) 
 
The Iranian Constitution affirms that the Islam is a comprehensive way of life, 
which serves as the basis of the Government and, also, regulates the legal relations of 
religion and society (Demiri 2009, 259). Yet, what is specific to this system is but the 
power of the eminent Islamic jurists (Velaet e Faqih). Since, as already mentioned, the 
system is based on hakamia and on the modeled shariocracy, with the authority of the 
Islamic experts (Faqih) and lawyers (mujtahid), a logical consequence is that, according to 
this worldview, the crucial guidelines for political action to be concentrated clearly in these 
figures. The supreme legal and religious experts (imams, Faqih) are concerned, that 
symbolize the fusion between the Islamic religion and politics as two mutually inseparable 
components. The system is still open to some level, because everyone has the right to study 
the Islamic law and to be Faqih. It is evident that this is a modified theocracy with 
Republican elements (available only for the participants of the Islamic affiliation), yet only 
through the prism of the European discourse, since the Islam does not recognize priesthood 
as an allusion to the religious establishment in Christianity. On the other hand, the practical 
discourse is very well perceived by Gellner, who states that in the absence of a tribal 
society and a support by His leadership (as the one of the Shah), the religious educated 
lawyers and experts can govern, tracing an egalitarian and an anti-intermediary current in 
the Islam (Gellner 1992, 18). 
Twelver doctrine (Ithna Ashariyyah) 
 
Inseparably connected to the Valiet Faqih principle of power is the official Shiite 
doctrine, Ithna Ashariyyah, which is overwhelmingly dominant in Iran. The doctrine 
recognizes twelve blood related successors (Imams) to the Prophet Muhammad, i.e. related 
by blood to His nephew and son-in-law Ali. The twelfth imam Muhamed al Muntazan 
“disappeared”, or retired from the world in 874. The return of the mysterious imam is 
expected in the last age of the world, when as a true believer and a leader (Mahdi), he 
would rule the country, establishing order, justice and a just Islamic order (Esposito 2003, 
62). In this sense, Khomeioni’s doctrine Valiet Faqih composes a system of governing until 
the reappearance of the twelfth imam. Thus, his absence is substituted by the Islamic jurists 
and the Grand Ayatollah. Should the question: how the system would look like on the 
possible “return” of the twelfth imam be posed, Khomeini solves the dilemma by 
transcendenting his power in a spiritual and a symbolic way. 
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POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS OF TURKISH AND IRANIAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
 
That government is best which governs least 
Henry David Thoreau  
 
Secularism and Islamism as concepts of the constitutional and the political model 
represent a model and a condition of all spheres of the political system in the contemporary 
Muslim states. The repercussions resulting from such a political constituency in the design 
of Turkey and Iran are visible, primarily, in terms of the actions of the central institutions, 
the political parties, the civil society and the political culture they create as agents of the 
political socialization. In addition, the two most important components where such 
repercussions are most pronounced would be discussed. 
 
Ideological and political indoctrination 
 
Both systems are highly ideological and their consequent indoctrination is helped by 
two key institutions. In Turkey, it is the army and in Iran – the Council of Guardians. The 
ideological and the political indoctrination reflect all segments of society. Thus, in Turkey, 
despite the Turkish nationalism elaborated in the previous section, the image and the act of 
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is clearly cultivated to the high level of sacrament. His photos are 
visible everywhere, and his posters, banners and similar symbols were part of every 
manifestation. Even the Constitution stipulates him as an eternal and an indisputable leader 
of Turkey, unrivaled in national history. Ayse Kadioglu notes that the political inclinators 
of Ataturk are related to the hatred of religion, even when sometimes the populist used 
religious symbols for respect (Ayse Kadioglu 1998, 11). A good example of the hypocrisy 
of the Turkish authorities, apart from recomposing of history, was the February 1998 law 
according to which the children were required first to complete eight years of secular 
education, and then to be allowed to attend the madrassas. The summer and the weekend 
study of the Quran were completely banned. Female pupils, female students and female 
teachers were forbidden to wear Hijab, even in Islamic schools, and such a ban existed 
many years before in other educational and government institutions (Tamimi and Esposito 
2000, 5). The monopoly of the Turkish secularism is visible even in the work of the Islamic 
Community, so, in all religious ceremonies, it is insisted on putting special emphasis on the 
Turkish nationalism, the respect for civil law and order, as well as the governing authority. 
Iranian case represents the other side of the same coin. Almost no activities 
incompatible with the Koran and the Islamic religion were permitted. The obligation of 
wearing Islamic dress in public life and the so called “Cultural revolution” that aimed at 
Islamization of all spheres of society, including universities, grew at a fast pace. Non-
Muslims were ordered to refrain from “behavior offensive to Muslims” and were excluded 
from all departments, except foreign languages and mathematics (Bakhash 1984, 226).  
The rhetoric was full of indignation, fanaticism and grotesquely shaped pacifism. 
The following statement of Khomeini best confirms our findings: “We want to expand 
Islam everywhere, but that does not mean that we will exported with bayonets [...] If 
governments adhere to Islamic principles we will support, if they will not, we will fight 
them without fear of anybody!” (Esposito 2001, 172).  
Journal of Liberty and International Affairs | Vol. 3, No. 1, 2017 | eISSN 1857-9760 
Published online by the Institute for Research and European Studies at www.e-jlia.com 
            
 
58 
 
What is more, the request of a death penalty of Salman Rushdie, the author of The 
Satanic Verses, only serves as a mobilization base for the militant Islamic structures and the 
affirmation of Iran's position in the region and, primarily, for the strengthening of the 
ideological and political indoctrination in society.  
 
Controlled and doctrinaire - limited multipartism  
 
The Turkish and the Iranian constitutional political model are but exclusive modes 
or systems exclusively open to entities that adhere to extremely ideological constitutional 
and political formations. In the first case, the limitation applies to entities that do not accept 
rigid secularism, while in the second, the political actors that express preferences beyond 
the Islamic doctrine. Such a designed framework narrows down the circle of possible 
participants in the political process.  
Until 1998, the Iranian constitutional and legal order did not recognize the existence 
of political parties. The Shiite religious and political paradigm perceives itself as a party 
(the party of Ali) and the Husein’s martyrdom in Kerbel, as well as the defeat of his forces 
of the army by Jezid the Caliph in 680 had a particular influence on the emerging of the 
Revolution in 1979. In that context, after the revolutionary transformation, a party system 
led by the Islamic Republican Party was established. However, the “stabilization” of the 
system and the attempts for the “democratization” and openness resulted in the 
Constitutional Amendment which approved the existence of political parties, provided they 
are not contrary to the Islam, the national sovereignty and the Islamic unity (Alaedini at al. 
2006, 623). Such a constitutive formulation, obviously, leads to a controlled multipartism, 
lead by a key institution with the authority to check their loyalty to the existing order and to 
approve or to veto their work for the Council of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution. 
For example, much of the ideological opposition (royalists, Marxists) were forced into 
exile. First, the Iranian Resistance Movement led by Shakur Baktair of the Social 
Provenance was forced to act from Paris. Yet, Ayatollah Khomeini was not merely limited 
to the ideological competitors. Also, the eminent political and religious experts and 
activists, such as Ali Sharia, Bazargan, Talikani and Sherijatmadari were forced to resign, 
to go into exile or to be processed due to alleged involvement in the conspiracy. We should 
not be fooled by the intentions of the reform wing, whose representative was Khatami, also, 
we should not be fooled by the Iranian Green Movement lead by Hussein Mousavi to adapt 
and liberalize some institutions (for example, increasing the power of the Parliament). The 
intention to democratize the Islamic political structures was permitted, yet not the 
ideological opposition. No legal political structure in Iran attacks the Valette Faqih 
principle, otherwise it would not be granted with its existence and the run for parliamentary 
elections. The main Parties: the Coalition of Builders of Islamic Iran (Ahmadinejad), the 
Islamic Coalition Party (the Asgaroladi) and the Union of Islamic Architects (Muhammad 
Reza Bahor) are firmly committed to the Islamic constitutive political principles. 
The Turkish case is largely equivalent to the Iranian model. Kemal Ataturk’s 
establishment of the militant secularist order resulted, primarily, in a one party system – the 
Republican People's Party. The situation did not change until 1946, when, for the first time, 
multiparty elections were held, and the Republican People's Party was defeated and the 
Government took over the Democratic Party. However, the key player in the multiparty 
system was the military. It made a coup three times: in 1960, in 1971 and in 1980. The first 
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time, led by General Cemal Gursel, the Government of the first democratically elected 
Prime Minister – Adnan Mendeles, was removed from the administration, due to the close 
relations with Moscow, as well as, initially, due to the affirmation of the Islamic affiliation. 
After the coup, he was sentenced to death by hanging, and, later, rehabilitated. The second 
time, due to internal unrest, the government of Suleyman Demirel was toppled. The army 
headed by General Memduh Tamac intervened in the political events, arbitrarily 
interpreting the existing political order as unsustainable. The third time, one of the most 
prominent events of 1980, the 1980 coup d’état, showed the true side of the war 
establishment. The series of violence, the religious “awakening”, the trade unions and the 
strikes were, again, a reason for the military to take over the power. Yet, this time, it 
resulted in the establishment of a military junta, the suspension of the activities of all 
political parties and in the arresting of many of the political leaders. General Kenan Evren 
(who, later, via a referendum, was elected a President), together with the head of his 
cabinet, Bulent Ulus, again, ousted the re-elected Prime Minister Demirel, and they 
declared martial law and banned all the political and trade union organizing. The action 
brought to nearly half a million people (among which prominent leaders, such as Suleyman 
Demirel, Bulent Ecevit and Nedzhmatin Erbakan) and processed about 280 000, with about 
50 death sentences. The military estimated each power according to its own ideological 
worldview, putting itself in the role of an undisputed guardian of the secularism, and 
against the conservative and Islamist currents. It was the organizer and the controller of the 
elections in 1983, and only 3 of 15 newly-formed parties were allowed to candidate for the 
elections (Ahmad 2006, 1368). Finally, in 1995, when Turkey received its first Islamist 
Prime Minister, Nedzhmatin Erbakan, the military forced him to resign his Memorandum 
and his Welfare Party (Refah) was banned. In this regard, General Cevik Bir, in April the 
same year, publicly announced that the Supreme priority of the military is to combat with 
the anti-secular Islamists (Tamimi and Esposito 2000, 5). Almost three and a half decades, 
the military had dominated initiatives for banning by the Constitutional Court and some 
political and religious organizations. Consequently, from the political life were eliminated: 
the National Party, the transformed National Salvation Party (both of Erbakan) and the 
groups “Followers of the Light” and the Sufi brotherhood (Mardin 1983, 144). The 
emergence of the Justice Party and the Development Party (AKP), as well as the leader 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the political ether, moved this discourse, bringing affirmation of 
the religion in the social life and recognizing the contribution of it in the moral construction 
of the individual; yet it must not be forgotten that it is essentially secularist and with 
Islamic inclinations. The strong traces of Kemalism limit every Islamist tendency to 
manifest in its original frames and force each entity to accept secularism as a priori 
designation in its action. Although a lot of laws and judicial processes limited the military's 
political involvement, AKP, accepting the Kemalism contribution, as well as banning the 
National worldview Islamic group (Milli Goruz), the Hismet and Fethullah Gulen 
movement, only managed to curb the militant secularism, (yet, still remaining within the 
secularist discourse) and it managed to give another dimension to the further political 
developments. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
The models discussed in the paper undoubtedly represent exceptionally strong 
constitutive-political benchmarks that gave dimension to the structure of the Muslim 
countries in the recent decades. They themselves are a framework that paves the way for 
further developments of the political scene in the Islamic world. Such a constellation 
undoubtedly raises the issues that are imposed in the introduction. Based on the elaboration, 
some concluding remarks can be singled out. They would capture the general image of the 
upcoming presentations, as well as reconfirm the thesis. 
Firstly, the Constitutive political design in both cases is different. The relationship 
between the authorities and their mutual control and balance is expressed through different 
structures, but it does not transcend the impression that the main impetus is the individual 
leader (in Turkey, until some time ago, the Prime Minister and, recently, the President, 
while, in Iran, the Ayatollah). The relationship between them and the pivotal element in 
charge of controlling the political processes (the army, or the Council of Guardians) is of 
great importance, so in the Turkish case, periodic cohabitation can be noticed, while in the 
Iranian, a permanent harmony. 
Secondly, it is obvious that both systems have political and ideological exaltation 
that gets codified through the constitutional provisions and principles. The systems are very 
limited for the opposite ideological movements. The institutional “filters” of the regimes 
that keep the sacred Kemalist-secularist or Islamist vocation were the military (though, 
now, with limited powers, yet, still a strong influence) and the Council of Guardians of the 
Revolution. The substantive differences in the two types are precisely the emphasis of some 
vis-à-vis other fundamental values of the system, with almost equal mechanisms of their 
“protection” and control. 
Thirdly, it is indisputable that both models have exclusionist nature and that 
promote one, at the expense of other ideological and political subject. The Turkish model 
preferred the secularists, declaratively and practically, and the Iranian – the Islamists in 
their genesis and programmatic orientation. In such a manner, they essentially stifle the 
ideological and the political pluralism, that is to say, they create an explicit ideological 
superiority, leaving no opportunity for value match and dialectical development as a 
consequence. Furthermore, since both regard the discourse opponents as idiosyncrasy and 
indignation. 
Fourth, due to these variables, it can be concluded that the absence of a different 
ideological opposition, through controlled and doctrine-limited multipartism, characterizes 
the regimes as undemocratic. An essential agent of democracy is the political pluralism, not 
the facade multipartism. This is not case with the restrictions for safety reasons, although 
they are often invoked. The political parties discharged in the past had no indication of 
violent seizure of power or of inciting national or religious bigotry, so their sanction would 
be justified. 
The direction of future development, i.e. pluralism of Turkey and Iran, to some 
extent, remains an enigma because there are no indications that they would be open to the 
opponent political factors. Perhaps the situation in Turkey is slightly more predictable due 
to Erdogan's inclination towards religion and its respect in society. However, authoritarian 
tendencies associated with stalling of human rights and freedoms, in particular freedom of 
speech and the media, would not improve the image of the Turkish political system, that is 
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to say, one shortage would replace another. The reformist wing in Iran, again, shows 
attempts to democratize the Islamic Republic, to increase openness to the West, yet it is not 
yet ready to accept the secular political parties in its core, or to show inclination towards 
freedom of choice of lifestyle or towards the liberalization of other segments of the social 
milieu. In this regard, the thesis of Zakaria for illiberal (i.e. judging by our framework, 
unpluralistic) democracy seems illusory. Economic rights and freedoms, without political 
and civil society, cannot be sufficient for a society to be called democratic. 
Benchmarks that would lead to eventual harmonization in the divided Muslim world 
in both cases should be based on mutual tolerance among secularists and Islamists; or as 
Martin Heper says: “A marriage between Islam and democracy in Turkey can be 
consummated if the radical secularists stop trying to impose their preferred life-style and 
set of values upon the Islamists, and if the latter do not undermine by word or deed he basic 
tenets of the secular democratic state in Turkey” (Heper 1997, 45).  
The very same, but in reverse, would apply for Iran, too. The attempt of their 
leveling and of placing them together is not impossible, although such a “marriage” 
requires a long and difficult period of building.  
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